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and decision-making processes in Latin America







Abstract In this article, political economies have been linked to the decision-making processes of 
Latin American countries, before and after 1989. Conservative and liberal reforms have 
usually been applied through neo-oligarchic decision-making processes. Social-dem-
ocrat economic policies have often been implemented with neo-corporatism. When 
“soft” populism prevailed, partitocrazia was the typical political instrument of lef tist gov-
ernments, either if they governed or if they were at the opposition. Thus, they usual ly ve-
toed rightist presidents’ market reforms. The political consequence of “hard” populism 
has been authoritarianism, like in Venezuela with Chavez and Maduro. In “hybrid” eco-
nomic policies, combining different models of political economies, there is not a stable 
decision-making process, and political conflict is usually strong.
Keywords Political Economy, Decision-Making Process, Populism, Technocracies, Party Government.
 Riassunto In questo articolo, le politiche economiche sono state collegate ai processi decisionali 
dei paesi dell’America latina. Le riforme conservatrici e liberali sono state di solito appli-
cate con processi decisionali neo-oligarchici. Le politiche economiche social-democra-
tiche sono state attuate grazie al neo-corporativismo. Quando il populismo moderato 
ha prevalso, la partitocrazia è stato il tipico strumento politico dei governi di sinistra: 
sia al governo che all’opposizione (nel secondo caso scattava il veto verso presidenti filo 
liberisti). La conseguenza politica del populismo radicale è stato l’autoritarismo (vedi il 
Venezuela di Chavez e Maduro). Nelle politiche economiche ibride, cioè che combinano 
tipi diversi di politica economica, il processo decisionale non è stabile e il conflitto poli-
tico è di solito molto forte.
Parole chiavi Politica Economica, Processi Decisionali, Populismo, Tecnocrazie, Partitocrazie.
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Introduction This essay is the continuation of the article on leftist populism1 that was published in 
Relasp Nº 1 (Fossati, 2020). Here, the political economies of the promoters of the other 
three democratic political cultures will be presented: the liberal, the conservative and 
the social-democrat (of the moderate left). Each model will be distinguished between 
the pre-1989 and the post-1989 phases. In fact, world politics has strongly conditioned 
governments in their choices of political economy. Thus, the empirical analysis of the 
political economies will be divided into two sections: one on the Cold War, and one on 
the post-1989 period. Then, those three models (plus populism) will be compared with 
the four different decision-making process of contemporary Latin American democra-
cies: neo-oligarchy, neo-corporatism, partitocrazia and party government. The six me-
dium/large countries of Latin America will be analyzed: Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, 
Chile and Argentina. 
1 In Fossati (2020), populism has 
been defined as a political culture 
with: a Manichean ideology with 
a binary cosmology of the world; 
the expansion of the public expen-
diture with damaging effects (very 
high inflation rates) on the econ-
omy; charismatic leaders making 
plebiscitary appeals to the popu-
lation, with a limited role of inter-
mediate actors (interests groups 
or parties) and institutions (parlia-
ments or governments); a high mo-
bi lization process from above lea-
ding to a strong movimientismo of 
the lower sectors of the population. 
There is just leftist populism, while 
rightist parties may be plebiscita-
rian (with a direct link between 
leader and masses), but not popu-
list, because they do not want to 
increase public expenditure. 
Political economies 
during the Cold War
During the Cold War, Latin American political economies have been strongly conditio-
ned by the division of the world into two blocs. The existence of the USSR, that promo-
ted both communist regimes and socialist economic institutions, indirectly pushed all 
(conservative, social-democrat and populist) governments of Latin America to apply tra-
de protectionism, after the 1929 crisis and during/after the Second World War. In fact, 
the USA would have never accepted socialism in Latin America, and thus protectionist 
populism represented the “next best thing” of that economic institution. The USA have 
always supported military regimes as the “lesser evil” of communism; that strategy has 
often worked, through wars or violent domestic coups, but sometimes (in Cuba and Ni-
caragua) communists prevailed. However, only Pinochet in Chile has applied laissez faire 
(austerity and privatizations) in the 1970s, on the contrary of the promoters of the other 
three political cultures. Instead, austerity (in fiscal and monetary policies) has been im-
plemented by liberals, conservators and social-democrats, but not by populists, who at 
the same have increased public expenditure. Finally, social-democrats and populists fa-
vored the working class (with either wages’ increases or pro-employment measures), 
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Radical leftist political economies: populism and protectionism
Import substitution industrialization (ISI) protectionist economic institutions were 
applied in Latin America after two shocks: the crisis of 1929 and the Second World War. 
Previous institutions had followed European colonization and were based on laissez fai-
re: the export of primary goods and the import of industrial products. ISI was based 
on two instruments: huge trade protection was granted to local producers, especially 
through tariff barriers; public subsidies were targeted towards national (either public 
or private) industry, while at the same time rural exporters were punished with some 
economic instruments (exchange rate over-valuation, taxes…). In the first decade (from 
1945 to mid 1950s) ISI was applied without either selection or gradualism. The first pha-
se of ISI was implemented in a context of expansive and irresponsible macro-economic 
populism (like in Argentina with Peron)2. In mid 1950s, Latin American countries were 
living a deep economic crisis, because populism had broken any tie with trans-national 
corporations. Thus, governments of middle class’ desarrollistas parties tried to attract 
multinational firms’ investments in the second phase of ISI: in the late 1950s and at 
the beginning of the 1960s (Sikkink, 1991). But those democratic governments could not 
bear the costs of that economic change, and there was a wave of soft military autho-
ritarianisms (the dictablandas). Pressures coming from the poor sectors of the popula-
tion pushed to another wave of democratic transitions in the late 1960s (the pendulum). 
Some populist governments went to power (like Allende in Chile and, again, Peron in 
Argentina) and there was an almost socialist military regime (of Velasco in Peru) that 
nationalized lands. Both political and economic mismanagement pushed most of Latin 
American countries towards social and political conflict, which was deeper in Southern 
cone societies (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay), where some violent communist groups 
acted (Cavarozzi, 1992 & Fossati 2020). 
Liberal political economies: Pinochet in Chile 
Thus, in mid 1970s there was another authoritarian transition in many Latin Ameri-
can countries; those military golpes were supported by the United States’ Republican 
administration of Nixon and Kissinger. Three extreme-right governments of the armed 
forces of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay repressed radical (communist or third-worldist) 
leftist groups. Those three military governments declared that they were going to in-
troduce deep economic changes, by promoting privatizations and exports. However, 
only Pinochet implemented laissez faire in Chile: not at first (in 1973), but only after the 
reforms of the Chicago boys (since 1975). Argentina and Uruguay applied conservative 
economic policies, with austerity, but without privatizations and trade opening. 
At the beginning of Pinochet’s administration, in September 1973, a moderate (conser-
vative) political economy was launched by the economy minister Leniz, whose reforms 
were very gradual (Cleaves, 1974). There was austerity, but no relevant privatizations 
were decided: only of those enterprises being nationalized by Allende (Arriagada, 1988; 
Remmer, 1989). In April 1975, as inflation had increased, Pinochet gave all the power to 
the Chicago boys, a group of economists of the Universidad Catlica, who had studied in the 
“capital” of radical liberalism. Gradualism was abandoned in favor of a shock therapy. 
The economy minister De Castro and the central bank president Baraona implemented 
a vast privatization program, with the opening to foreign trade and investments. Ra-
dical market reforms touched social security, labor legislation, education and pension 
2 ISI institutions were “suggested” 
by the structuralist scholars of the 
United Nations Commission for 
Latin America (Cepal) of Santiago 
de Chile, whose leader was the ar-
gentine economist Prebisch. Their 
thesis was that capitalism, through 
colonialism (with both transnatio-
nal corporations’ exploitation and 
the unequal terms of trade), was 
the origin of dependent under-deve-
lopment of the south from the 
north. According to Prebisch, ISI 
was the best strategy to break de-
pendence and to favor economic 
development. For the debate on 
dependence and development the-
ories (of Marxist, neo-Marxist or 
post-Marxist scholars), see: Fossati 
(1997), Geddes (1991).
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systems. Chile became an experiment for the application of the radical laissez faire theo-
ries of the Chicago school, at a wider extent of the USA with Reagan and the UK with 
Thatcher, because the latter were democratic regimes. The limited supervision of public 
institutions over the Chilean economic liberalization process produced some negative 
externalities. The 1981 financial crisis led to the failure of nearly 12 banks (45% of the 
total amount) that had channeled too many credits to the large business groups, which 
had bought state enterprises (Zeitlin & Ratcliff, 1988). In June 1982, there was a devalua-
tion of the exchange rate, and at the end of 1983, all the Chicago boys had left the govern-
ment. But the financial crisis did not end the Chilean miracle, as structural reforms had 
stabilized Pinochet’s political economy (Drago, 1998). 
The economic ministers, Caceres (since February 1983) and Escobar (since April 1984) 
of the new executive applied more moderate market reforms, that is to say with some 
heterodoxies. The exchange rate was liberalized, and some price controls were intro-
duced; the state channeled some credits to private enterprises (of the agriculture and 
construction sectors). In fact, that government was close to business groups. Inflation 
rate was kept under control, but after a conflict between two ministers (Escobar and 
Collados), Pinochet decided a new change (Sanfuentes, 1984, Silva 1992, 1993, 1996a/b). 
At the beginning of 1985, a bureaucrat of the high public administration, Buchi, beca-
me the economy minister and turned to a pragmatic liberalism. He launched negotia-
tions with business groups in political economy decisions (Valenzuela, 1994; Velasco, 
1994). Trade opening was stronger, taxes were lowered; prices controls were reduced 
to some basic agriculture products, privatizations were increased, the financial system 
was supervised, public administration was reformed. However, the copper industry of 
the north has never been privatized. In the second half of the 1980s, Chile signed some 
agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while the Chicago boys had 
refused any foreign supervision. Chilean economic performances improved and foreign 
investments increased, while in the 1970s they had been lower also because of low hu-
man rights record of Pinochet (Kline, 1993). In sum, Chicago boys’ political economies 
were (radical) liberal, while Caceres and Escobar (1983, 1984) applied more moderate 
market reforms, and Buchi (1985, 1989) found a pragmatic (but always liberal) mix be-
tween state governance and laissez faire (Fossati, 1997). 
Conservative political economies: 
all the other military governments (the Argentinian case)
After the Second World War, there have been two waves of military regimes. The first 
one was that of the dictablandas (end of the 1950s, beginning of the 1960s), which had 
tried to continue the project of desarrolistas parties: applying austerity with cuts to public 
expenditure, trying to attract foreign investors, but refusing privatizations and trade 
opening. That attempt failed and populists like Allende and Peron returned to power. 
The second wave of military regimes was more radical, but Argentine and Uruguay pro-
moted neither privatizations, nor trade opening. At the same time, the working class 
was penalized with cuts to wages and salaries, higher unemployment (in Argentina it 
decreased of 35%), together with the repression of the labor strikes. All those military 
regimes were labeled by O’Donnell (1973) as bureaucratic-authoritarian governments3.
The most studied case of a military regime that has implemented conservative political 
economies (that is to say austerity, with trade protectionism, anti-labor measures, but 
without privatizations) is Martinez de Hoz’ Argentina. After the military golpe of March 
3 This analytic category cannot be 
applied to Pinochet, that applied 
market reforms, while bureaucra-
tic-authoritarian governments had 
an economic nationalistic ideology, 
and refused both privatizations and 
trade opening (Fossati 1997). 
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1976, president Videla named Martinez de Hoz as the “super-minister” of the economy, 
and declared that Argentina was going to abandon ISI institutions and to promote pri-
vatizations. At the beginning (in April 1976), some heterodox measures (like controls 
of public tariffs, prices, and interest rate; the overvaluation of the exchange rate with 
the side-effect of a parallel black market) were applied. In July 1977, Martinez de Hoz 
implemented a financial reform, with the liberalization of the interest rate and the uni-
fication of the exchange rate. But inflation kept increasing. In December 1978, Martinez 
de Hoz reintroduced the overvaluation of the exchange rate (with a limited devaluation) 
and controls to some prices and public tariffs. Also (public and private) foreign debt 
increased, through the intermediation of the Central Bank. The perverse effect of those 
processes was the increase of capital flight, encouraged by a further liberalization of 
capitals in July 1980 (Schvarzer, 1983a). Thus, there was conflict with rural exporters that 
were damaged by the overvalued exchange rate. The balance of payments remained in 
surplus until 1978, but since 1979 it turned into deficits. 
Trade opening and privatizations were both limited, because Argentine armed forced 
were very nationalistic (Fontana, 1984). Martinez de Hoz could promote only few priva-
tizations, in some less relevant sectors: for example sugar, paper, and in services like ho-
tels and banks. Then, some privatizations were also promoted by the same public firms 
at the peripheral level (Canitrot, 1980). Argentine armed forces did not want to privatize 
in order not to harm the public Fabricaciones Militares and those sectors that were se-
lling primary goods (oil and steel) to them; for example, protectionism was main tained 
in petro-chemistry (Remmer, 1989). There were no privatizations in public utilities and 
in transports (the fleet and airlines companies). Military expenditures naturally increa-
sed, and local provinces’ debt was not put under control (Lewis, 1989). Then, only re-
dundant imports tariffs were reduced, but non-tariff barriers were maintained. Since 
November 1976, the protection rate lowered from 93% (in 1976) to 53% (in 1977) to 29% 
(in 1978), to 26% (in 1979). However, trade policies were highly discriminatory. Cars and 
iron metallurgy sectors, selling products to the state military industry, were protected 
with non-tariff barriers (Lucangeli, 1989). 
Thus, Argentina armed forces vetoed most of Martinez de Hoz’ liberalization measures, 
and they remained divided in many rival factions, contrary to the centralized Chilean 
armed forces under Pinochet. The high interest rates favored the increase of small fi-
nancial institutes that made joint ventures with large national banks. The high increase 
of foreign credits favored the channeling of a lot of money (through short-term depo-
sits) to the local business groups, without any state control. Many industries became 
incapable of paying their debts, and four important banks failed in March 1980. The sta-
te governance of the financial system had remained limited. Then, the central bank in-
creased again its money offer; thus, foreign debt also increased. Savers lost their trust in 
the Argentine financial system and capital flight increased. The effects of the financial 
crisis were worse than in Chile, as in Argentina there had been no structural reforms. 
In February ’81, there was an unexpected devaluation (of 10%) of the currency rate, but 
it was not enough. Both Videla and Martinez de Hoz left power (Basualdo 1987; Azpiazu 
& Basualdo 1989).
The government of Martinez de Hoz must be labeled as conservative, because he com-
bined austerity, penalization of the working class, with few privatizations and low trade 
opening. Martinez de Hoz had tried to apply laissez faire, with a financial liberalization, 
but the armed forces pushed him to turn to conservatism (in fiscal, exchange rate and 
income policies). The reason of Martinez de Hoz’ failure must be attributed to the armed 
forces. Instead, the governments of the final phase of the military regime were incohe-
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rent since the beginning: Viola/Siguaut (March/December 1981), Galtieri/Alemann (Decem-
ber 1981/June 1982), Bignone/Dagnino Pastore (July/August 1982) and Wehbe (August 
1982/December 1983). Those governments elaborated incoherent political economies that 
materialized a hybrid between conservative and social-democrat economic policies; the 
outcome was a deep economic crisis (Nogues, 1988; Schvarzer, 1983b; Dornbusch 1989). 
Social-democrat political economies: 
the democratic governments of the 1980s (the Brazilian case)
In 1982, the foreign debt crisis exploded (Griffith-Jones, 1988). During the 1980s, all La-
tin American governments applied austerity in order to negotiate debt rescheduling 
with the IMF. ISI institutions survived in all the countries of the region; there was fis-
cal and monetary adjustment, but structural reforms (privatizations, trade and finance 
opening) were not implemented. Many técnicos played relevant roles in democratic go-
vernments (Teichman, 1997), but suffered vetoes from parties that opposed privatiza-
tions and favored working class, whose wages increased or remained stable. The highest 
wage increase materialized in Brazil, thanks to Sarney’s Cruzado Plan and its gatilho, an 
indexed wage scale, that favored a 50% wage increase in the 1980s (Sola, 1991; Bresser 
Pereira, 1993). All the other democratic governments maintained a stable wage level in 
that decade. 
Instead, Alan Garcia declared a moratorium to foreign banks and applied radical leftist 
“hard” populism that pushed Peru to a deep economic crisis in 1989 and hyper-inflation 
(Fossati, 2020). Thus, Peruvian wages decreased of 60% in the terminal crisis of Garcia’s 
administration: from 1987 to 1989. In the same two years, Alfonsin’s economic mismana-
gement led to a 20% decrease in real wages of Argentine workers (Fossati, 1997). 
Alfonsin’s hybrid between leftist (social-democrat and populist) 
political economies
In December 1983, the new democratic president, Raul Alfonsin (of the Unión Cívica 
Radical -UCR-), named Grinspun as economy minister and Concepción as central bank 
president. They were both populist, and immediately raised export taxes to rural expor-
ters; then, Grinspun tried to declare a moratorium to foreign banks, but his attempt 
failed. In December 1984, Argentina signed an agreement with the IMF in order to get 
his foreign debt rescheduled. 
In February 1985 Alfonsin replaced Grinspun with Sourrouille at the economy minister. 
Plan Austral was launched June 14th 1985, and received the approval of the IMF. It was an 
austerity package (with fiscal and monetary adjustment), coupled with some heterodox 
measures (prices, wages and exchange rate freeze). Sourrouille came from Cepal and 
was a typical leftist technician, while central bank president Concepción was populist. 
Plan Austral had also been communicated to the capitanes de industria that approved it, 
but without participating in its design (Ostiguy, 1989; Feletti & Lozano 1991).
Since the beginning, Alfonsin chose a condominium between moderate (social-de-
mocrat) and radical (populist) left. Thus, the failure of Plan Austral did not depend on 
the timing of those heterodox measures (for example on how long should the price 
and exchange rate freeze last) that in the 1980s have often been applied by moderate 
left govern ments, like in Sarney’s Brazilian Cruzado Plan of February 1986. How can a 
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govern ment implement a coherent economic policy if there is a populist at the central 
bank and a promoter of rigor at the economy minister? Thus, Alfonsin political econo-
mies materialized a hybrid between the two lefts, and this “unhappy” choice has been 
the premise of the failure of his reforms. In August 1986, Alfonsin decided to change 
the president of the central bank, Concepción, with Machinea, that like Sourrouille was 
close to Cepal and its moderate4 left political culture, but it seemed that it was probably 
too late. The Argentine economic crisis had already worsened too much. 
In February 1987, Sourrouille relaunched the freeze of prices, wages and exchange rate 
with Australito, but it did not work. He also tried to lower import tariffs, but received the 
opposition of the industrial producers; thus, the trade liberalization project was sof-
tened. The Peronist union, the Confederación General de Trabajo (CGT), had already 
started his conflict with Alfonsin, and during his administration thirteen general stri-
kes were declared against the Radical president. Public deficit had increased because of 
wages’ increases, provinces’ expenditures of local governments that were controlled by 
the Peronists, absence of privatizations and opening to foreign investments. 
In August 1988, Sourrouille launched Plan Primavera, but in September it was rejected 
by the IMF that had signed a (failed) agreement with Argentina in July 1987. In Plan 
Primavera the double exchange rate was maintained, and thus Sourrouille received the 
opposition of rural exporters. The World Bank, thanks to the lobbying of the US presi-
dent, supported Plan Primavera, but that was not enough. Then, Alfonsin also pushed 
his economy minister to increase public expenditure. In fact, the Radical president had 
turned populist, having been weakened by CGT strikes, and thus he coopted some Pero-
nist politicians (like Alderete, the labor minister) in his government. Alfonsin also made 
an alliance with another Peronist politician (Cafiero) to try to increase taxes, but that 
project was rejected by both rural exporters and industrial producers. At the end of 1988, 
Argentina had to stop to pay his debt to foreign banks. 1989 was the year of hyper-infla-
tion and the massive exchange rate speculation against Austral. Sourrouille applied the 
Plan Carneval in February, but it immediately failed; he renounced in March. 
The new economy minister Pugliese inherited a deep economic crisis and applied (with-
out any success) some emergency measure with increases of public tariffs, taxes and 
interest rate. After the victory of the Peronist candidate Menem in the Presidential elec-
tions of May 14th 1989, Pugliese resigned, and Rodriguez became the new economy mi-
nister. Popular assaults, encouraged by various Peronist organizations, to shops and su-
permarkets started the May 22nd and lasted until the 30th (the so-called Saqueos). Alfonsin 
was finally pushed to abandon power before the end of his mandate. The Radical leader 
resigned the July 8th 1989 and Menem became the new president (Acuña et al., 1988; Ru-
sso, 2003; Sabato, 1988; Vacs, 1987; Teichman, 1997).  
4 In the 1980s, Cepal had aban-
doned Prebisch’s radicalism, that 
was close to the populist political 
culture. In 1985, the new secretary 
(the Argentine economist Gon-
zales) pushed Cepal towards the 
moderate social-democrat political 
culture. 
Political economies 
a�ter the Cold War 
Only after 1989, Latin American governments started to apply those structural reforms 
(privatizations, foreign trade and investments opening), which had been implemented 
fifteen years before only by Chile. International politics has strongly conditioned politi-
cal economies, and Latin American governments did not develop any learning process 
from Pinochet’s Chile that has been the only coherent and successful experiment of eco-
nomic liberalization in the Cold War. Only after the collapse of communist countries 
(and of their socialist economic institutions), ISI protectionism was abandoned and 
privatizations were implemented. Thus, models of conservative and social-democrat 
political economies changed (see the italics below), and both privatizations and trade 
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opening were promoted. The difference between liberalism and conservatism was an-
chored to radical or moderate laissez faire; conservatism applied heterodox measures, 
like exchange rate freeze or controls to capital movements5. Market reforms were deci-
ded by technopols6 (Dominguez, 1997), compatible with Evans’ (1992, 1995) theory of embed-
ded autonomy. After 1989 populism had disappeared, but since 1998 it was promoted by 
Chavez, being applied in two versions: the hard (Venezuela) and the soft (Morales in Bo-
livia, Correa in Ecuador, Cristina Kirchner in Argentina) one. Nestor Kirchner was clo-
ser to social-democracy, like Lula in Brazil (Fossati, 2020). According to Krasner (1988), 







































Menem I/Cavallo (1991-96): conservative political economy
The right-wing Peronist president Menem, elected in May 1989, inherited Alfonsin’s 
deep economic crisis. At first, there were two attempts of implementing market refor-
ms. The first (from July to December 1989) economy minister (Rapanelli) was a member 
of the main export-oriented business group (Bunge y Born). Rapanelli tried to fight both 
foreign creditors (by continuing the 1988 moratorium of debt service) -but that decision 
had received the tacit support of the IMF- and the industrial groups (with cuts to public 
contracts), but he failed. The following economy ministry, Gonzales privileged relations 
with foreign creditors, and debt payment started again in June 1990. He cut subsidies 
to industry, receiving the opposition of the ISI-oriented groups7. Export taxes to rural 
exporters decreased, even if the exchange rate had remained overvalued. Inflation kept 
increasing and Gonzales resigned in February 1991 (Basualdo, Lopez & Lozano, 1990; 
Feletti & Lozano, 1991; Smith, 1991; Manzetti, 1993; Acuña, 1994; Kosacoff & Bezchinsky, 
1994; Teichman, 1997). 
In March 1991, the new economy minister Cavallo applied a conservative package that 
has been the only coherent and successful strategy in recent Argentine history. Market 
reforms (cuts to public expenditure, high controls to money printing, tax simplification, 
liberalization of interest rate, capital movements, prices and wages) were coupled with 
an heterodox measure: the exchange rate freeze, with the ley de convertibilidad (one peso 
= one dollar) of April 1st 1991. The IMF had requested a liberalized exchange rate. Cavallo 
gave autonomy to the central bank, that exercised some controls on interest rates (to fa-
vor investments), fought fiscal evasion, and froze wages’ indexation clauses. He applied a 
privatization program to compensate the end of public contracts to ISI-oriented business, 
and to reward foreign creditors with debt for public companies swaps of the Plan Brady agree-
ment of April 1992; foreign debt was discounted of 20-35%. Rural business had their export 
taxes reduced, but suffered Cavallo’s over-valued exchange rate. The CGT accepted Me-
nem’s reforms (much more anti-labor than Alfonsin’s ones) for political reasons. In March 
1992, Cavallo signed an agreement with the IMF. Argentine was living economy stability. 
5 For the difference between ortho-
doxy and heterodoxy, see Fossati 
(1991). On market reforms, see 
Weyland (2002).
6 Technopols’ functionaries of the 
1990s came from the same think-
tank: Fundación Mediterránea in Ar-
gentina, Cieplan in Chile, Iepes in 
Mexico, Instituto Libertad y Democra-
cia in Peru, Iesa in Venezuela, then 
Cardoso’s Cebrap in Brazil.
7 For a more detailed analysis of 
the different coalitions of business 
groups in Latin America, see Fo ssa-
ti (1993a).
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After Menem’s re-election in May 1995, Cavallo denounced corruption cases in the go-
vernment, and Menem pushed him to resign in July 1996. Cavallo had applied a conser-
vative economic policy, with some heterodox corrections (the exchange rate freeze) to 
liberalism (Geddes, 1994; Gerchunoff & Torre, 1996; Corrales, 1997; Gibson, 1997; Iazze-
tta, 1997; Starr, 1997; Teichman, 1997; Blake, 1998; Corrales, 1998; Williams, 2002). 
Menem II (1996-99): hybrid between conservatism and leftist populism
Since 1997, Menem increased again public expenditure: at both central and provinces’ 
level; the state deficit doubled. The exchange rate remained frozen and peso over-
valuation continued, on the contrary of Brazil that devalued real in 1999: after the 
Russian and Asian crises. Many public bonds (with flexible interest rates) were sold 
to finance state deficit. While Peronist unions had remained silent in previous years, 
because of Cavallo’s success, since 1998 strikes started to increase again, when the 
economic crisis reappeared. In sum, economic policies of Menem II were a hybrid, 
through a compromise between Cavallo’s conservatism (with the fixed exchange rate) 
and leftist populism (Hudson, 1999; Pastor Jr. & Wise, 1999; Pozzi, 2000; Treisman, 
2004; Setser & Gelpern, 2006). 
De La Rua (1999-2001): hybrid between conservatism and leftist social-democracy 
In October 1999, the Radical candidate De la Rua defeated the Peronist Duhalde and 
Cavallo. In December 1999, De la Rua became president and chose Cepal’s Machinea as 
economy minister. He applied a mix of conservative measures (with the long-lasting 
fixed exchange rate) and typical social-democrat policies, like the increase of taxes (the 
so-called impuestazo of December 1999). In Argentina there was, at the same time, a high 
public deficit, inherited from Menem, and a high foreign debt, inherited from the mi-
litary regime. Negotiation with the IMF soon started, and an agreement was signed in 
March 2000. In March 2001, De la Rua changed the economy minister, and Machinea 
was replaced by Cavallo. New taxes were applied to financial transactions, but that de-
cision favored the increase of capital flight. December 1st 2001, Cavallo implemented the 
Corralito plan, with the bloc of banks’ private accounts and limits to cash operations. The 
IMF stopped his support to Argentina. There were many popular riots, encouraged by 
the Peronist organizations. Cavallo renounced December 20th, De la Rua, the 21st (Mu-
ssa, 2002; Schamis, 2002; Weyland, 2002; Murillo & Levitsky, 2003; Russo, 2003; Mus-
tapic, 2005; Llanos 2010; Steinberg 2017; Cavallo & Cavallo Runde 2018). The 2002 crisis 
was the outcome of the bad economic choices of two presidents who applied hybrid 
political economies: Menem II in the late 1990s and of De la Rua at the beginning of the 
2000s. Radicalism is a hybrid between right and left also in Europe and in Italy, like with 
Pannella’s party. 
Nestor (2003-7) & Cristina Kirchner (2007-15): 
social-democrat and populist political economies
Then, there were two Peronist presidents. Nestor Kirchner (from May 2003 to Decem-
ber 2007) followed social-democrat neo-desarrollistas political economies, while Cristina 
Kirchner (from December 2007 to December 2015) turned to “soft” populist policies (see 
Fossati, 2020). 
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Macri (2015-19): from liberal to conservative political economies
The rightist candidate (with the support of the Radical party) Macri won the elections of 
October 2015 and defeated the Peronist candidate Fernandez. He started his mandate 
in December. Macri applied a liberal political economy, without any heterodox freeze. 
The exchange rate was unified, together with a devaluation (of 30%) of the peso; capital 
movements were liberalized; taxes to rural exporters were lowered; controls to public 
tariffs were eliminated. In February 2016, an agreement with private holders of public 
bonds (7,5% of the total) -that had not accepted previous (and less favorable) formulas 
(promoted by Peronist presidents)- was reached; they lost only 25% of their investments. 
Macri issued other public bonds, with high interest rates. Foreign debt, public deficit 
and inflation rate (that reached 50% in 2019) all increased, together with capital flight. 
In March 2018, a “conservative” tax on financial operation was introduced. In May 2018, 
Macri signed an agreement with the IMF, with a very large amount of new credits. In 
April 2019, popular protests and strikes against Macri started. Only in September, new 
controls to capital movements were introduced. The IMF kept supporting Macri. Howe-
ver, Argentine economic performance was not so good, but there was not any deep eco-
nomic crisis. He was the first not Peronist president to finish his mandate in December 
2019 without resigning. This “happy ending” probably was the outcome of Macri’s cohe-
rence in his economic policies, avoiding hybrid reforms, like those of Alsonsin and De 
La Rua. In fact, Macri applied at first (2015/17) liberal political economies, but in 2018/19 
he turned to conservatism, with some heterodox measures like capitals’ controls. (Ba-
sualdo, 2020; Buchieri & Mancha Navarro 2019, Llanos, Maya 2019, Margheritis 2019, 
Simonoff 2019, Sturzenegger 2019).
Fernandez (since December 2019): 
hybrid between leftist (social-democrat and populist) political economies
The Peronist candidate Fernandez defeated Macri at the October 2019 elections. Then, 
he has applied an incoherent mix of social-democrat economic policies, with “hetero-
dox” cuts to interest rate, and soft populist reforms, like the increase of pubic expendi-
ture (Fossati, 2020; Murillo & Zarazaga, 2020).
Brazil 
Collor (1990-92): hybrid between conservatism and liberalism 
In the 1980s Brazil applied a social-democrat political economy; the “heterodox” (with 
the freeze of exchange rate and prices, but not of wages) Plan Cruzado of 1986 contained 
wage-indexation clauses. In December 1989, the rightist Collor defeated the leftist leader 
Lula in the presidential elections; he probably won because of the support of Brazilian 
TV networks. He faced two kinds of oppositions: from ISI-oriented business (like San 
Paulo industrialists) organized in FIESP, and from leftist parties in parliament. In Brazil 
export-oriented business groups are weaker for the low modernization of the rural sec-
tor. Collor chose a total isolation from industrial business groups, and did not negotiate 
with them. Being a “new comer”, Collor did not enjoy the majority in parliament, and he 
started to use selective patronage towards congress members in order to have his market 
reforms approved. Thus, his government became easy victim of bribes, coming from 
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sectors that wanted to be favored by the reforms. In March 1990, the economy minister, 
Zelia Cardoso, launched a hybrid mix of heterodox (like prices and wages freeze) and or-
thodox (limits to public expenditures, interest rate policy, exchange rate liberalization, 
privatizations, trade opening) reforms. Then, banks’ private accounts were frozen; that 
decision was an indicator of the deep political conflict, as it is an emergency (post-crisis) 
measure. After May 1991, the new economy minister Moreira chose a less conflictive re-
lationship with business, by lowering interest rate and unfreezing prices, but it was too 
late. In December 1992, Collor was impeached for corruption, and even members of his 
party voted against him. He could not overcome parties’ and business’ vetoes against his 
government. Collor’s reforms were an incoherent mix between liberal (privatizations 
and exchange rate policy) and conservative (freezing of prices, wages, and especially of 
banks’ private accounts) measures (Bresser Pereira, 1991 & 1993; Sola 1991 & 1993; Ross 
Schneider, 1992; Barrios de Castro, 1993; Flynn, 1993; Longo, 1993; Weyland, 1993; Payne 
1994; Iazzetta, 1997). 
Cardoso (1995-2002): from conservative to liberal political economies
Franco became president in December 1992, with a deep economic crisis, and a high 
inflation rate. When he was vice-president, he had criticized Collor’s market reforms, 
but after some months of transition (he fired two different economy ministers), in April 
1993 he chose a new economy minister: the former dependentista scholar of the Cepal, 
Cardoso, who in the meantime had turned moderate. In July 1994, Cardoso launched 
a new currency (Real) with an exchange rate pegged to the dollar, cuts to fiscal expen-
ditures and liberalization of the interest rate. Cardoso was trying to imitate Cavallo’s 
conservative political economy, with a moderate (and heterodox) application of laissez 
faire. His reforms were quite successful and inflation was brought under control. Car-
doso was a good negotiator and maintained intense network of ties with the industrial 
business, until new presidential elections could take place. In October 1994, Cardoso 
defeated Lula in the elections and became president in January 1995. As he did not reach 
the majority in the congress, and parties were obstructing laissez faire (public adminis-
tration reform, tax increases, trade opening…), he formed a coalition government with 
moderate left and right. In October 1998 Cardoso defeated Lula again in the presidential 
elections, and in December he signed an agreement with the IMF. Brazilian economy 
was put under stress by the Russian and Asian crises. In January 1999, Cardoso devalued 
the real and applied a liberal (without heterodoxies) political economy. Brazil’s econo-
mic performances worsened, but without any deep crisis. In September 2001, there was 
another agreement with the IMF (Kaufman Purcell & Roett, 1997; Resende Santos, 1997; 
De Souza, 1999; Goertzel, 1999; Amann & Baer, 2000; Power, 2001/2; Weyland, 2002, 
Samuel 2003, Treisman 2004, Cason 2007). Cardoso has been quite coherent in eco-
nomy. As a sociologist, he had been leftist (first radical, then moderate), but Brazilian 
electoral competition (against Lula) pushed him to conservatism, as his social policies 
remained weak; after 1999 devaluation, he turned to orthodox liberalism. In October 
2002, Lula finally won the presidential elections. 
Lula (2003-10) and Rousseff/Temer (2011-18): social-democrat political economies
In October 2002, Lula was elected president of Brazil and started his mandate on 
January 2003. There were expectations that Lula could follow Venezuela’s populism. 
Instead, he followed Cardoso’s path, with a renewed commitment to control public ex-
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penditure and to maintain the flexible exchange rate. In September 2002, Cardoso had 
signed another agreement with the IMF, and Lula complied with Brazil’s obligations. 
Lula increased welfare state investments (to give aid to poor families, to improve the 
education system and the food production), and implemented pro-labor measures (with 
the increase of minimum wage and the decrease of unemployment). Brazil economic 
performance in the eight years of his administration were good, but in 2008 there was 
the world financial crisis (Hunter & Power, 2005; Sola, 2008; Power, 2010; De Souza, 
2011). His candidate of the Labor Party (Dilma Rousseff) won the presidential elections 
in October 2010 and 2014. She also followed moderate left political economies. The ex-
change was often depreciated, and devaluations favored Brazilian exports. Investments 
in social programs were maintained, and increased in the housing and the environment 
sectors. Lula and Dilma suffered investigation for corruption charges. Since March 
2015, popular protests of rightist citizens started; they accused both leftist presidents of 
corruption, and processes started in December 2015. Rousseff was impeached in August 
2016 (Arestis & Saad-Filho, 2007; Hagopian, 2016; Melo, 2016; Pickup, 2019; Boschi & 
Santos Pinho, 2019, Braga & Dos Santos, 2020; Saad-Filho, 2020) and was substituted 
by Temer, from the 1980s center-left party of Sarney. In 2014, Brazilian economic perfor-
mance worsened and recession started, but it was not a deep economic crisis. Lula was 
arrested for corruption charges in April 2018, and in March 2019 Temer was arrested 
too. Lula was released in November 2019.  
Bolsonaro (since 2019): conservative political economy
In 2019, Bolsonaro’s economic policies have been conservative. The central bank often 
cut interest rate; the exchange rate was maintained flexible (Hunter & Power, 2019), and 
public expenditure was lowly increased to face economic crisis. But Bolsonaro’s mana-
gement of Covid emergence has been poor.
Chile
Aylwin, Frei RuizTagle, Lagos, Bachelet (1990-2009, 2014-8): 
social-democrat political economies
The elections of December 1989 were won by the moderate Christian-Democrat candida-
te Aylwin, who defeated the rightist Buchi. Aylwin named Foxley (of Cieplan) as economy 
minister, who did not return to populism and protectionism (Cox & Edwards, 1992; An-
gell, 1993). The Chilean left focused on pro-labor measures: the improvement of workers’ 
legislation, of welfare state policies, and the increase of real wages (of 30%) from 1990 
to 1995. Foxley institutionalized negotiations with business and labor organizations that 
had remained informal with Buchi, but the right vetoed higher tax increases (Angell & 
Graham, 1995; Montecinos, 1990, 1993; Vergara, 1994; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995; Kinney 
Giraldo, 1997; Weyland, 1999). Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Lagos, and Bachelet did not change left’s 
economic policies (Hojman, 1995; Muñoz & Stefoni, 2002; Valenzuela & Dammert, 2006; 
Pribble & Huber, 2010; Borzutsky 6 Weeks, 2010; Madariaga & Kaltwasser 2019). 
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Piñera (2010-13) and since 2018: liberal political economy
After 20 years of leftist presidents, the rightist Piñera became the new president: in 
March 2010 (until March 2014) and then in March 2018. In his first mandate, Chile had 
good economic performance, but there were students’ protests against Piñera’s project 
to implement privatizations in the education system (Luna 2016; Niedtzwiecki & Pri-
bble 2017). In October 2019, there were mass demonstrations against the increase of 
transport and electricity fares; they lasted until March 2020, when the Corona Virus 
emergence started. Piñera declared the state of emergency; police repression caused 
nearly 30 deaths. In November, there was a currency crisis and the central bank de-
valued peso. Piñera’s only change in economy was cutting social expenditure, which 
had been increased by the left. This decision produced a deep conflict with the poorest 
sectors of society, but also had a negative impact on Chilean economic performance 
(Gonzales & Moran, 2020; Kaltwasser, 2020).
Mexico 
Salinas (1988-94): liberal political economy
In July 1988, the PRI candidate Salinas won Mexican presidential elections. He broke 
with ISI protectionism, and applied a liberal political economy; in May 1989 he signed 
an agreement with the IMF. Within his government, there were different camarillas (ne-
tworks) of politicians; some were in favor of market reforms of finance minister Aspe, 
while those linked to the protectionist industrial groups were against them. Two PRI 
leaders declared that political reforms were also necessary, but they were killed in 1994: 
Colosio (the presidential candidate for the 1994 elections) in March, and Massieu (the 
secretary-general) in September 1994. Some “PRI-nosauros” (among them, Salinas’ bro-
ther), probably made an alliance with narco-traffickers and organized the killings of Co-
losio and Massieu. These events led to the currency crisis of the end of 1994, also because 
peso was overvalued; capital flight was favored by the regional liberalization of capitals 
within Nafta. After the Tequila Crisis, Mexico was close to abandon laissez faire and re-
turn to protectionism, or even populism (Camp, 1990; Bracet-Marques, 1992; Morris, 
1992; Heredia, 1993; Uapef, 1993; Barbosa, 1994; Centeno, 1994; Fox, 1994; Cansino, 1995; 
Luna 1995; Springer & Molina, 1995; Golob, 1997; Teichman, 1997; Boylan, 2001; Williams, 
2002). The PRI candidate Zedillo won the August 1994 elections.
Zedillo (1994-9) and Peña Nieto (2012-18): conservative political economies
In December 1994, Zedillo devalued the peso 10%. In February 1995, Clinton decided to 
support Mexico with a strong economic aid approved by the US congress, and an ex-
traordinary agreement with the IMF was signed. Thanks to the US aid, the Mexican sta-
te saved many banks after the Tequila crisis. Thus, Zedillo turned to conservatism, and 
also implemented some political reforms to limit electoral fraud. In 1999, Mexico signed 
another agreement (of one year) with the IMF that kept supervising Mexican econo-
mies, even if without any new credit. All the neo-corporatist institutions, encouraged 
by PRI before 1989, were dismantled (Lustig, 1996; Gibson, 1997; Reding, 1997; Kaufman 
Purcell & Rubio Freidberg, 1998; LADB Staff, 1998; Samstad, 2002; Reyes, 2018). 
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In July 2012, PRI’s Peña Nieto was elected president. In January 2014, a financial reform 
strengthened state supervision and pushed banks to support producers; the exchange 
rate remained flexible (Flores Macías, 2016; Greene & Sánchez Talanquer, 2018; Bitz-
berg, 2020). Both Zedillo and Peña Nieto applied conservative economic policies, becau-
se of their financial heterodox measures. 
Fox (1999-2006) and Calderón (2006-12): from liberal to conservative political economies
Rightist presidents of PAN, Fox (Lawson, 2004; Rubio & Kaufman Purcell, 2004; Pastor 
Jr. & Wise, 2005) and Calderón (Villareal, 2010; Temkin Yedwab & Salazar Elena, 2012; 
Weisbrot & Ray, 2012; Reyes, 2018) applied liberal economic policies until 2008, with 
high interest rates; after the 2008 financial crisis, interest rates were reduced, and the 
political economy turned conservative.
Lopez Obrador (since 2018): 
hybrid between leftist (social-democrat and populist) political economy
In July 2018, Mexican bipartitism was broken by a new leftist party (Morena). Presiden-
tial elections were won by Lopez Obrador, who defeated both PRI and PAN candidates. 
Since December 2018, Lopez Obrador has applied a mix between social-democrat and 
(soft) populist reforms, with increases of social expenditures to favor the poorest Mexi-
can citizens (Speck, 2019; Jimenez, 2020).
Peru
Fujimori: from liberal (1990/2) to conservative (1993/8) 
to hybrid (1999/2000) political economies
In April 1990, the independent candidate Fujimori won Peruvian presidential elections 
against the rightist Vargas Llosa, supported by the main business groups. The leftist 
candidate of APRA, Alva Castro, arrived third. The new president applied liberal politi-
cal economies (the Fuji-shock), with the increase of prices and public tariffs, but with no 
devaluation. Fujimori’s first economy minister (Hurtado) decided his reforms with the 
support of the World Bank and the IMF. In February 1991, he named Boloña (from De So-
to’s Instituto Libertad y Democracia) as economy minister, who decided a new austerity 
program (with some anti-labor measures) in November 1991. Leftist parties, like APRA, 
were blocking privatizations, as Fujimori had no parliamentary majority; they were su-
pported by protectionist industrial business. Since mid 1991, when Alan Garcia began to 
be persecuted for corruption, opposition became stronger. At the beginning of 1992, the 
parliament approved a law limiting president’s powers of decree. That situation pushed 
Fujimori to dissolve parliament and change the constitution (with his autogolpe in April 
1992) to be able to introduce those market reforms, that were vetoed by parties. In 1992 
some small banks failed, while the World Bank suspended its programs after the autogol-
pe, and the USA postponed its credits until new elections were organized in November 
1992 (Franco, 1990; Costa, 1993; Gonzales de Olarte, 1993; Rodrich, 1993; Daescher, 1994; 
Tulchin, 1994; Wise, 1994; Mauceri, 1995; Roberts, 1995). In January 1993 Fujimori named 
Camet (the leader of the umbrella business association of the export-oriented groups) 
as economy minister. He pushed the central bank to control interest rate, but the ex-
change rate remained flexible. Thus, political economies shifted from radical liberalism 
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to “pragmatic” conservatism. In March 1993, Peru signed an agreement with the IMF, 
that lasted until 1999. Camet remained economy minister until June 1998, when he was 
replaced by three other técnicos, and Boloña returned from July to November 2000. The 
last two years of Fujimori were characterized by incoherent political economies, with a 
hybrid between conservatism and leftist populism (public expenditure increased). Po-
litical conflict was becoming very intense in Peru because of Fujimori’s project of being 
elected for a third term, and of the corruption charges against him. He won the April/
May presidential elections, but the congress threatened him with the impeachment; 
thus, Fujimori resigned in November 2000 (Cameron & Mauceri, 1997; Mauceri, 1997; 
Stokes, 1997; Levitsky, 1999; Schmidt, 2000; Arce, 2003 & 2005; Kelly, 2003; Levitsky & 
Cameron, 2003; Carrión, 2006). 
Toledo (2001-6), Garcia (2006-2011), and Humala (2011-16): 
social-democrat political economies
After Fujimori, three moderate left’s politicians became presidents of Peru: Toledo in 
2001 (Peru Posible), Alan Garcia in 2006 (APRA), and Humala in 2011 (Partido Nacionalista 
Peruano). They implemented austerity and privatizations, within social-democrat eco-
nomic policies, in order to favor labor and improve welfare state (Weyland, 2002; Barr, 
2003; Wise, 2003; Taylor, 2005; Mc Clintock, 2006; Arce, 2008; Burron, 2012; Levitt, 2012; 
Sanchez-Sibony, 2012; Vergara & Encinas, 2016; Vergara & Watanabe, 2016; Avilés & Rey 
Rosas, 2017; Durand, 2017; Tanaka & Morel, 2018).
Kuczynski (2016-17) and Vizcarra (2018-20): social-democrat political economies
Kuczynski (Peruanos por el kambio), Toledo’s economy minister, was elected president in 
June 2016. In March 2018, Kuczynski resigned after parliament’s impeachment. Vizca-
rra became president, and made an autogolpe dissolving parliament in September 2019. 
New parliament elections were held in January 2020. In May, he signed an important 
agreement with the IMF, but Vizcarra also received an impeachment in November 2020. 
Both presidents applied moderate left’s economic policies, with heterodox measures, 
like cut of interest rate (Dargent & Muñoz 2016; Vergara, 2018). 
Sagasti (2020-21): hybrid between conservatism and social-democracy
Sagasti (of the center Morado party) will govern until new presidential elections of mid-
2021. Public debt was high (35% of GDP), as social expenditures increased after Covid 
emergency. In March, he decided to cap interest rates. Sagasti has applied a mix of con-
servative and social-democrat reforms. 
Venezuela
Perez (1988-93): liberal political economy
In December 1988, the Acción Democratica (AD) candidate Perez became president. Ve-
nezuela started to apply liberal political economies (el gran viraje), after an agreement 
with the IMF in February 1989. The main government’s ministries came from the IESA 
business school of Caracas, whose director was the economist Naim. At first, opposition 
came from the poorest sectors of the population, that spontaneously rioted (in the Cara-
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cazo) at the end (27-28) of February 1989; military repression led to 300 deaths8. Market 
reforms continued. The IESA boys’ structural adjustment was successful at first, with 
the highest growth rates in the region (in 1990). At the end of 1991, Perez lost the majo-
rity in his party and his leadership was weakened. Many reforms (privatizations, banks’ 
reform, and the introduction of the VAT tax) were blocked in the parliament. Fiscal de-
ficit had increased since the fall of oil revenues after the 1991 Kuwait War. The IESA 
boys negotiated with the export-oriented and financial groups, but opposition came for 
the “rent-seeking” local (industrial and rural) business groups, who were nostalgic of 
protectionist ISI and patron-client relations of pre-1989 Venezuela. This conflict led to 
the first golpe attempt by Chavez (leader of the populist sector of the Bolivarian armed 
forces) in February 1992. Chavez was imprisoned, but parties in congress did not de-
fend the democratically elected president. AD and Copei (like former president Calde-
ra) members attacked Perez and asked for the “heads” of the reform técnicos. State bu-
reaucracy, in the public administration and in the judiciary sector, was against market 
reforms. After Chavez’ attempt of golpe, IESA boys (central bank president Tinoco and 
economy minister Rodriguez) were fired. Rosas (of Copei) became the new economy 
minister. The promoters of the second golpe of November 1992 coerced the Venezuelan 
president to free Chavez. In March 1993, Perez received the impeachment, and resigned. 
After two AD interim presidents (Lepage and Velazquez), there was a financial crisis in 
January 1994; El Banco Latino and 13 other banks failed. Caldera won the February 1994 
elections as an independent candidate, defeating Fermin of AD (Coppedge, 1992, 1994a, 
1994b; Philip, 1992; Naím, 1993; Mc Coy & Smith 1995).
Caldera (1994-98): hybrid between leftist (social-democrat and populist) political economies
Since 1994, Caldera (former Copei member, then independent) became president. Vene-
zuelan democracy had been challenged by Chavez. Caldera granted amnesty to him and 
the promoters of the two 1992 golpes. He implemented incoherent economic policies, 
and heterodox social-democrat reforms (prices and exchange rate freeze), were coupled 
with populist measures (public expenditure increase). His economy minister Baptista 
left government in June 1994; his successor Sosa was fired in February 1995, when Cal-
dera named a populist (Azocar). The outcome was a deep economic crisis (Geddes, 1994; 
Davila, 2000; Weyland, 2002; Coppedge, 2005; Alvarez, 2006). Then, golpista Chavez won 
the December 1998 presidential elections. Maduro is governing since his death in 2013 
(see Fossati, 2020).  
8 For a comparative analysis of esta-
llidos sociales in Argentina, Peru and 







The various political economies will be compared with the main decision-making 
processes of Latin American democracies, in order to understand if there is a linkage 
between economy and politics. In Fossati (1997), the decision-making processes of La-
tin American democracies in the first half of the 1990s had been classified within this 
typology. The two selected dimensions were: a) the main government partners in deci-
sion-making: groups (business and unions) or parties; b) institutionalized or personali-
zed (by formal or informal relations) negotiations9.  9 All governments’ decisions are 
taken in collaboration with both 
(business and/or labor) groups and 
parties, but the typology identifies 
the prevailing trend. On the rela-
tion between business and democ-
racy, see Durand & Silva (1998). 










Which is the relation among the (conservative, liberal, social-democrat, populist) mo-
dels (and the hybrids) of political economy and the (neo-oligarchy, neo-corporatism, 
partitocrazia, party-government) decision-making processes of contemporary Latin 
American democracies?  
In neo-oligarchies, cohesive change teams promote market reforms. Technopols make 
decisions (Dominguez, 1997); they are autonomous, but informally negotiate with bu-
siness groups’ (not the associations) and unions’ (not the formal secretary) leaders. In 
pre-1989 authoritarian regimes, there were technocracies, but without negotiations 
with lobbies. Neo-oligarchy was applied in liberal (Perez, Fujimori and Salinas) or con-
servative (Cavallo and Cardoso) economic policies; the former prevailed in the 1990s, the 
latter after the 2008 crisis. Evans’ (1995) theory on embedded autonomy -elaborated in the 
analysis of Asian tigers’ evolution from ISI to export promotion in the 1960s (Ha ggard, 
1990)- linked change to two conditions. First, governments and bureaucrats must be 
autonomous from lobbies; second, governments must negotiate (with an embedded 
network of ties) with interest groups. If government are too isolated, like technocratic 
Collor in Brazil, they are going to fail. Venezuelan IESA-boys did not confirm Evans’ 
theory, as both conditions of the embedded autonomy were present; they were autono-
mous and negotiated with business groups, but were forced to renounce (by Chavez). 
Neo-oligarchies have continued (with Piñera, Macri, Bolsonaro…), even if with less co-
hesive governments; change teams were necessary at the beginning of the 1990s, when 
most of privatizations have been implemented (Teichman, 1997; Centeno & Silva, 1998; 
Williams, 2002; Dargent, 2015).
Neo-corporatist10 decisions are institutionalized in trilateral bodies, with ministers, bu-
siness associations’ and unions’ representatives. In both neo-oligarchies and neo-corpo-
ratism, parliaments’ power is limited; in fact, they only have a sort of ratification power. 
Neo-corporatism was coupled with social-democrat political economies: of leftist Chi-
lean presidents and of Lula/Rousseff in Brazil. 
In a partitocrazia, the most powerful actors are parties, who veto (Tsebelis, 1995) gover-
nments’ reforms, like austerity and privatizations. Pro-laissez faire presidents increased 
the use of decrees, within the so-called delegative democracies, also because they rarely 
enjoyed majority in parliaments11 (O’Donnell, 1992). Then, parties have often promoted 
impeachments to presidents, who had tried to apply market reforms: Perez in Vene-
zuela, Collor in Brazil, Rousseff in Brazil, Kuczynski and Vizcarra in Peru. The concept 
of partitocrazia was borrowed from Italian policies, where party secretaries’ agreements 
were more important than ministries’ decisions. In Latin America, parties were far 
from playing the role of “gate-keepers” that favored democratic consolidation (and eco-
nomic liberalization) in Europe (Morlino, 1986). Leftist parties (especially Apra) strongly 
opposed Fujimori’s market reforms in Peru, and pushed him to dissolve parliament. The 
same happened in Mexico (with some “PRI”-nosauros) and in Venezuela (with Copei and 
AD). If liberal reforms fail, leftist populist parties prevail. Chavez/Maduro applied hard 
populist political economies, and Venezuela became authoritarian. In Argentina, Cristi-
na Kirchner applied soft populism, and Argentina remained a partitocrazia with Peronist 
presidents (Fossati, 2020). According to Haggard and Kaufman (1995), market reforms 
10 Old corporatism was applied for 
example by Mussolini in Italy. In 
fact, parliament had been dissol-
ved, and the Camera dei Fasci e delle 
Corporazioni, with representatives of 
business and workers, substituted 
it. Corporatism had been an insti-
tution of the Middle Age in several 
parts of Europe (for example in 
Tuscany), before liberal democracy 
emerged in England.
11 On the relation between market 
reforms and elections, see Stokes 
(2001). On the current party sys-
tems in Latin America, see Roberts 
(2014) and Mainwaring (2018). On 
parties in Latin America, see also 
Corrales (2000). 
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in Latin America have been obstructed when party systems are polarized, like in Ar-
gentina, with the cleavage of Radicals versus Peronists. The Justicialista party has always 
opposed not Peronist presidents, with the so-called alternancia imperfecta (Russo, 2003). 
Macri could finish his mandate, on the contrary of Alfonsin and De la Rua, be cause his 
economic policies were more coherent than those of the two Radical presidents. 
Finally, party governments are the outcome of the majority versus opposition relation-
ship, with a relevant role of parliaments. The example is the United Kingdom, where 
the leader of the winning party becomes prime minister. In Latin America, this process 
has not materialized yet, especially because many parties objected market reforms, and 
pushed governments to use decrees.
In hybrid (Alfonsin, Menem II, De la Rua, Collor, Caldera) economic policies, the de-
cision-making process is not stable: neither neo-oligarchic, nor neo-corporatist, nor 
party-centered. At the end of Caldera and Menem II mandates, partitocrazia pre vailed. 
Alfonsin had two schizophrenic technopols, while De la Rua incoherently mixed two 
economic projects: Cavallo’s conservatism and Machinea’s social-democracy. Co-
llor’s economy was hybrid too; then, he was politically isolated. These three presidents 
applied incoherent economic reforms since the beginning, and at the end they had to leave 
power, after a deep political crisis. Lopez Obrador, Fernandez and Sagasti are also appl-
ying hybrid economic policies in recent years: in Mexico and Argentina between social- 
democrat and populist reforms, while in Peru it’s a combination between conservatism 
and moderate left programs. 
According to Ross (2001), market reforms have been rejected by countries with rele-
vant energy resources. Mexico, Venezuela and Ecuador export oil, while Bolivia is a lar-
ge gas producer. In Mexico and Venezuela, relevant social and political actors opposed 
economic change. Two important PRI’s leaders were killed in Mexico, and there were 
two (leftist populist) military coups in Venezuela. Mexico suffered a stock exchange and 
currency crisis, but did not abandon laissez faire, as the USA supported Zedillo with an 
aid package with the IMF supervision after the 1994 Tequila crisis. Venezuela stopped 
market reforms and shifted again towards protectionism, populism and authoritaria-
nism (with Chavez and Maduro). Oil did not halt economic change in Mexico, where 
an external state (the USA) played the anchor role (Whitehead, 2002) in democratic and 
economic changes, as Mexico belongs to Nafta.
In sum, conservative and liberal reforms are usually applied through neo-oligarchic 
decision-making processes. Social-democrat economic policies are often implemented 
with neo-corporatism. When “soft” populism prevails, partitocrazia is the typical political 
instrument of leftist governments, either if they govern or if they are at the opposition. 
Thus, they usually veto rightist presidents, who have been trying to introduce market re-
forms. The political consequence of “hard” populism has been authoritarianism, like in 
Venezuela with Chavez and Maduro (Fossati, 2020). In hybrid economic policies, there 
is not a stable decision-making process, and political conflict is strong. 
Unfortunately, Latin American democracies have not improved their political perfor-
mance since the 1990s. Political systems are prisoners of the institutional schizophre-
nia that couples presidentialism with parliaments elected through proportional electo-
ral systems. Thus, the chiefs of state rarely enjoy majority in their parliaments (Linz & 
Valenzuela, 1994; Valenzuela, 2004). The two coherent combinations are the Usa (with 
presidentialism and majoritarian electoral system) and Europe (with parliamentarism 
and proportionalism). This unhappy oxymoron seems to have cultural origins, within a 
continent that has inherited proportionalism by Europe, and has imitated US presiden-
tialism. It is like a son with divorced parents. It seems difficult that Latin America may 
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renounce presidentialism, because all those countries have a strong fascination towards 
the cult of the jefe. Then, it is even more unlikely that proportionalism is abandoned, 
because citizens prefer representative democratic institutions; thus, party systems re-
main very fragmented12. If this schizophrenia continues, presidents willing to introdu-
ce laissez faire shall be able to rely only on technocrats, and parties will keep obstructing 
neo-liberalismo; thus, these seem the two sides of the same coin. Instead, in USA and 
Europe, the populist anti-market ideology has been weak, and post-1945 (moderate right 
and left) parties have played the role of “gate-keepers” that has favored both economic 
liberalization and democratic consolidation. But the future is unwritten, because leftist 
populism is also emerging in Europe (see Movimento 5 stelle in Italy) after the 2008 
financial crisis.
12 The exception was Chile’s “bino-
mi nal” proportional electoral sys-
tem, which had been introduced 
by Pinochet in 1988. It was a de facto 
majoritarian system, that had fa-
vored stable bipartitism in Chile, 
but it has been irrationally elimi-
nated in 2015.
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